WHY NO TAKERS FOR LTTE’S CEASEFIRE OFFER

--Jehan Perera
 
Five days before the commencement of the SAARC Summit meetings on July 27, the LTTE announced its intention to declare a unilateral ceasefire from July 26 to August 4 to cover the duration of the event.  This announcement was initially made through a statement issued to the world at large through the media, and was subsequently conveyed to the government by the Norwegian facilitators.  The LTTE’s offer was immediately rejected by the government as a ploy to gain a respite from the government’s military operations and to make a play for international attention.
 
The government’s negative response to the LTTE offer was not surprising.  Ceasefires between warring parties usually occur in situations of protracted stalemate, when both sides find themselves stuck and hurting.   The present news from the war front is invariably of government progress.  The media carries stories of one LTTE camp after another falling to the government forces.  There is little or no reliable information about government losses, although there are hearsay accounts that the casualties in hospitals are larger than the government is prepared to admit.
 
What is noteworthy, however, is the lack of positive response of the international community to the LTTE’s offer.  Sections of the international community have been assertive in affirming the need for a political solution to the ethnic conflict, as opposed to a military solution.  But there have been no reports of either foreign governments or international organizations urging the government to reciprocate the LTTE’s unilateral ceasefire.  This is indicative of the severe crisis of credibility that accompanies the LTTE in relation to its commitment to peace and to which it needs to give its mind.
 
The absence of any positive response to the LTTE’s ceasefire offer points to the need of the LTTE to reassess its past behaviour and to find ways to rebuild its credibility with the world at large.  The scant respect that the LTTE showed in the latter stages to the Ceasefire Agreement that it entered into with the government in 2002 has seriously eroded the credibility of the organization as a partner in any future peace process.  It is difficult for anyone who has been following recent events to forget how the LTTE provoked the present government by its crude military actions shortly after the Presidential election of November 2005 which it had subverted by its imposed boycott of Tamil voters in the north and east.
 
 
POSITIVE ASPECTS
 
Despite its lack of credibility, the positive aspects of the LTTE’s unilateral ceasefire must not be discounted.  The immediate beneficiaries would be the visiting foreign delegations for the SAARC Summit.  It is unlikely that the LTTE could have penetrated the very tight security measures that the government has taken, closing main roads in Colombo and requiring staff at the conference venue to stay on without going home for the entire duration of the Summit.  But the assurance of the LTTE’s unilateral ceasefire would also add to the sense of security of all the participants at the meetings.
 
Another important gain would be to bring back the issue of a ceasefire into the public debate.  There is no doubt that the former Ceasefire Agreement got very much discredited due to the LTTE’s conduct in the final stages in 2005-06.  Thereafter the government was able to project its own abrogation of the Ceasefire Agreement and military actions against the LTTE as justifiable ones.  From that time onwards the general population has been acquiescing in a brutal military conflict, with its terrible human rights violations, on the premise that victory will be quick, even by the middle of this year, as the government had promised.
 
On the other hand, it is becoming increasingly clear that the government’s battlefield successes notwithstanding, the war is dragging on beyond the government’s earlier time tables.  The suffering of the civilian population in the war zones is immense.  Both the Bishops of Mannar and Jaffna, whose areas of religious authority cover the present battle zones, have issued statements describing the plight of tens of thousands of people, driven from place to place by the shifting of battle zones.  The LTTE’s recruitment of virtually all able bodied adults and use of human shields, and the government’s artillery and air bombings add to the catastrophe of the civilians.
 
Despite the repeated claims of military success, it is not advisable to disregard the possibility of the past repeating itself.  So far the government victories have been in the western part of the Wanni, whereas the LTTE’s core strength lies in the eastern part.  As the areas cleared of the LTTE get larger, the amount of soldiers needed to hold the territory effectively grows exponentially.  Independent military strategists are agreed that the harder battles and LTTE counter attacks are yet to come, and there is no guarantee of success.
 
 
SUSTAINABILITY QUESTION
 
There are also questions that need to be asked about the sustainability of the government’s military strategy.  This is not the first time that government forces have regained large tracts of land from the LTTE in the course of the war.  In the period 1988-90, the Indian army took control of nearly all of the north and east, driving the LTTE into hiding in villages and in the jungles. Operation Jayasikuru conducted by the Sri Lankan army in 1997-98 also led to the capture of large tracts of land, so much so that the government was emboldened to say that 96 percent of the war had been won.
 
No less an authority than army commander, General Sarath Fonseka has said that the imperatives of Tamil nationalism are such that the LTTE can remain a guerilla force of about a thousand for ten to twenty years.  In such circumstances it is clear that there cannot be real peace or reconstruction of the north and east for decades, and this in turn will impact upon developments in the rest of the country.  This is why a second track of a negotiated political solution needs to be kept open.  The government’s initiative to evolve a political solution through the All Party process is an important contribution in this regard.  A ceasefire could be another, though it would need to be linked to the political solution that includes acceptance of Sri Lanka’s unity and the decommissioning of weapons.
 
The international community has an important role to play in creating the conditions for a new ceasefire agreement in the future. It was reported in the media that prior to the LTTE’s unilateral ceasefire offer, they made contact with their offices abroad to ascertain their views.  One possible task for the international community is to engage in dialogue with the LTTE’s branches abroad and assist the LTTE to make a self-criticism of those elements of their past strategies that have led to disaster to the Tamil people in Sri Lanka. If the government relaxes its embargo on peace emissaries going into the Wanni to meet with the LTTE, this same effort can be made locally as well.
 
The LTTE’s ceasefire offer would have more credibility if it is accompanied by clear and convincing evidence of a change of heart and approach in the direction of a political and negotiated process of conflict resolution.  The stopping of forcible recruitment, killing of civilians in terror attacks, and the killing of political leaders, such as TULF MP and human rights activist Dr Neelan Tiruchelvan, whose 9th death anniversary was commemorated this past Sunday, would figure high on this list. Whatever its motivations, a ceasefire is not to be lightly offered or rejected as it offers a new space and a new opportunity for peace.  Creating the ground for a ceasefire is a humanitarian obligation.